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Abstract
The Information Systems literature observes that, while there are ostensibly benefits to sharing of data and
information, barriers to organisational data sharing appear significant. Managers may be understandably
concerned that the sharing activity is adversely affecting their own organisations. This paper develops a model
of data and information sharing based on the traditional system model, and proposes a theory of the sharing
activity in organisations. The paper theorises that employees may engage in or oppose sharing based on the
assessment of perceived benefits accruing to themselves from the activity. In particular, the paper highlights the
contention that data and information sharing are likely to decrease as organisations grow in size, and also
offers an explanation for why the sharing activity is so poorly undertaken in modern organisations even though
the technological capability to support it may be there.
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INTRODUCTION
An early expectation of information and communication (ICT) technologies was that they would enable greater
sharing of data, information and knowledge in organizations. Such sharing would ostensibly lead to
improvements in organizational functioning and performance (e.g. Power 1983; Yu et al. 2001; Li 2002; Roth et
al. 2002; Sahin and Robinson 2002). However, expectations on this front have become more circumspect over
time in light of evidence that actually achieving sharing is rather more difficult than initially expected (e.g.
Davenport 1994). Goodhue et al. (1992) note that “the ability to make coordinated, organization-wide responses
to today’s business problems is thwarted by the lack of data integration” and, with respect to information
sharing, Davenport et al. (1992) argue that “the rhetoric and technology of information management have far
outpaced the ability of people to understand and agree on what information they need and then to share it [so]
the information-based organization is largely a fantasy”. Even in a scientific research environment, where
information sharing is at least prima facie an explicit norm of the community, barriers to sharing appear
substantial (Hubbard and Little 1997).
It has been argued that ownership perceptions and organizational norms influence the sharing of data and
information (Jarvenpaa and Staples 2001; Hart 2002) and therefore also affect stakeholder attitudes and political
activities related to information systems development (Hart 2002). Hirschheim and Newman (1991) observed, in
their investigation of information systems development, that:
“it can often be noted that there is a mystical value attached to the ownership of data.
The sharing of data is thus to be avoided. There is a strongly held belief that harm will
come from others accessing ‘our’ data, often without any basis in experience”.
This paper focuses on data and information sharing behaviour. Because much research interest currently focuses
on organizational knowledge, as opposed to data and information, management and sharing, we feel the wider
issue of data and information sharing behaviour has been neglected (e.g. Nelson and Cooprider 1996; Hendricks
1999; Augier et al. 2001; Bartol and Srivastava 2002; Bock and Kim 2002; Jones 2002; Tsai 2002; Swart and
Kinnie 2003).
For the purposes of explanation and simplicity, we present our analysis from the point of view of data sharing
only and consider later what differences, if any, information as opposed to data sharing might entail. Moreover,
since our aim is to understand and capture in a formal model at least certain aspects of the process leading to a

decision of whether or not to share data, we need a general model of decision-making on which to base the
subsequent argument. Again in the interests of simplicity, we adopt the traditional rational subjective expected
utility (SEU) theory model of decision-making (e.g. Schoemaker 1982) even though we acknowledge that this
model of actual human decision-making may have significant deficiencies (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1986).
It is, however, beyond the scope of our purpose in this paper to address the issue of how more sophisticated
theories of human decision-making may affect the analysis we present below.

PRELIMINARIES
Consider a dataset D0, which may be partially or wholly non-computerized. In general there may be multiple
datasets Di in an organization, each of which may be considered to consist of other distinct data subsets, but to
simplify the analysis we consider only one such set, D0, from now on.
A dataset such as D0 can be used as an input to a process that operates on it in some way to produce an output.
This output is commonly called “information” (e.g. O’Brien, 1993: p.21). Diagrammatically:

D0

Process (P)

Information (I)

Figure 1: Standard Input (Data) – Process – Ouptut (Information) model
A wide variety of different processes can operate on the dataset D0 in this way. As a result, the situation is in
practice more like that shown in Figure 2, which shows the dataset as input to multiple processes P0, P1, P2, …,
Pn leading to the various information outputs I0, I1, I2, …, In.
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Figure 2: Multiple processes operating on the same dataset to produce different information outputs
While the various processes operating on the dataset D0 may produce different information outputs, it is also
possible that they produce outputs that are incompatible with or contradictory to each other. Moreover, the set of
processes P0, P1, P2, …, Pn may, in the most general case, be extended to include everything that could
conceivably be done with the dataset D0, including things that would be considered legitimate, as well as those
that might be considered illegitimate.
The different processes P0, P1, P2 … Pn may be associated with various organizational actors. Process Pi may
actually be operated by organizational actor Aj. On the other hand the connection between a process and
organizational actor may only be potential. For example, process Pi may not exist in reality, but if it did then the
perception might be that a certain actor Aj would be the likely one to run it. In general. a single organizational
actor may be linked to multiple processes. However, there is no reason why different actors may independently
actually undertake the same processing on the same dataset to produce the same information output.
The link between processes and actors is, in general, many-to-many. We illustrate this by further expanding
Figure 2 to produce Figure 3, which is re-oriented for clarity and in which A0, A1, A2 … Am are organizational
actors and the dashed connections indicate their associations with the various processes P. A dashed link
between an actor Ai and a process Pj indicates that Ai either could run Pj on dataset to produce D0 to produce
output Ij.
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Figure 3: Multiple processes operating on a dataset to produce different information outputs, also showing the
organizational actors associated with those processes.
Value of process outputs and information
An organizational actor Ai can be expected to attach some value to actual and potential information outputs,
regardless of whether the process is associated with themselves or another actor Aj. We may also expect that the
value placed on a particular information output by one actor will, in general. differ from that placed on the same
output by a different actor. This inherent value may be positive, negative or zero.
Value of data sharing
The actual value (the subjective expected utility in SEU theory) an actor Ai attaches to some information output
Ik resulting from process Pk that is associated with actor Aj will depend on their subjectively estimated
probability of that output really being produced. As an example, even though a potential information output Ii
might be extremely valuable to some actor, if the probability of its actually being produced is estimated by that
actor to be zero then its actual value to them would be zero. Thus, the value of an output must be weighted by
its probability of production in order to see its actual value.
The perceived probability of production of a certain information output is, however, actor-dependent. That is,
one actor’s estimation of the probability of the production of a certain output may be different from that of
another actor. We may, therefore, represent the probability estimated by actor Ai of an actor Aj operating some
process Pk to produce an information output Ik as pijk. Note that the probabilities pijk are considered to be
independent of one another. That is, the probability of one actor running a particular process to produce a certain
output is assumed to be unrelated to the probability of occurrence of any other process.
Now consider actor A0 who controls dataset D0. What would be the value to A0 of sharing D0 with all other
actors? This is given by:
V0 = Σj≠0Σk=0..np0jkv0jk
That is, the value to A0 is the sum, in accordance with SEU theory, across all actors (other than themselves) and
all processes of the actual value to them of the information outputs that those actors and processes will produce
from D0. If this turns out to be positive (but not zero) then a rational value-maximizing actor A0 may be
motivated to share the dataset D0 with all other actors.
In a similar way, the value to some other actor Ai (not A0) of A0 sharing dataset D0 with all other actors is:
Vi = Σj≠0Σk=0..npijkvijk
If Vi (i ≠ 0) is positive then we may expect that the relevant actor (Ai) will be motivated to push for A0 to share
D0 with all other actors.

Restricted sharing
The calculations above relate to sharing across all actors. However, there are other possible cases to consider
which involve more restricted sharing behaviour. Consider the value to actor Ai of A0 sharing dataset D0 with Ai
alone. This is:
Vii = Σk=0..npiikviik
If Vii is positive but Vi is negative then actor Ai will be motivated to get A0 to share D0 with them, but also for
them to block A0 sharing D0 with any other actor. More generally, the value to Ai (not A0) of A0 sharing dataset
D0 with a third actor Aj, is:
Vij = Σk=0..npijkvijk
If this is positive, then we may expect that actor Ai will be motivated to get A0 to share D0 with the third actor
Aj.
It remains to consider the intermediate case of sharing with some proper subset A ⊂ {A0, A1, …, Am} of all
other actors. Suppose that α is the set of index values of the members of A. Then, the value to an actor Ai of A0
sharing dataset D0 with the members of A is:
Viα = Σj∈αΣk=0..npijkvijk = Σj∈αVij
and, if this is positive, Ai will be motivated to get A0 to share with the members of A. However, it is important to
note that we may expect the value of ViA to vary if the membership of A is changed. This being so, if there is a
subset A for which ViA is positive and maximal. then Ai will be motivated to share with this specific subset of
actors in preference to any other subset (or all) actors. If there is no subset A for which ViA is non-negative then
the actor Ai will not be motivated to push for the actor A0 to share D0 with any other actor and, if it is
significantly negative, they can be expected to actively oppose such sharing because they would deem it to be
detrimental to their interests.

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA AND INFORMATION SHARING
In the light of the analysis above, we now explore the circumstances under which it can be expected that all
organizational actors concur in the sharing of dataset D0 with all other actors. On the assumption that the actors
are rational value maximizing entities, this would entail that, for every actor Ai, Vi be not only non-negative, but
also maximal. On the less restrictive assumption that the actors are merely satisficing entities (Simon 1957), it
would still entail that, for every actor, Vi be non-negative although not necessarily maximal. Either way, it
would seem that as organizations increase in number of actors, the likelihood of such conditions holding would
progressively decrease and, consequently, also the likelihood of unproblematic organization-wide data sharing
(an expectation that seems consistent with literature evidence).
This model can also explain an organizational actor’s willingness to share processed outputs, or what we have
here termed “information”, but at the same time for them to be reluctant to share the input data that was used to
produce that information. As an example, in her classic study of the Financial Information System (FIS)
implementation, Markus (1983) says:
“Prior to FIS, divisional accountants summarized raw data on the transactions in their
divisions and sent the summaries to the corporate accountants for consolidation.
Divisions retained control of their own data and exercised substantial discretion in
summarizing it…After FIS, however, all transactions were collected into a single database
under the control of corporate accountants [so] FIS automatically performed the
divisional summaries [and also] corporate accounts had the ability to “look into” the
database and analyse divisional performance”
The explanation is as follows. If the actor A0 provides a certain information output I0 directly to another actor
A1, rather than the dataset D0 from which it was drawn, then A0 has successfully constrained the information
received by A1 to I0 only. On the other hand, if A0 were to release the dataset D0 to A1, then A1 could at least
potentially generate not only I0 but also any number of other potential outputs Ii that will be of varying value to
the original actor A0 in line with our analysis above. Moreover, the receiving actor A1 may signal that they will
only generate output I0 for themselves but in fact generate a different output Î0 that is significantly different from
the original I0 that A0 would have provided. In any case, it may well be that the actor A0, in assessing the value
to them of A1 having I0, is greater than the value to them of A1 generating Î0 for themselves together with the
risk that they will also generate some or all of the other possible outputs Ii in addition.

In terms of the discussion above, actor A0 here represents the divisional accountants, the corporate accountants
are represented by actor A1, the divisionally provided transactions summaries are I0, the corporately generated
divisional transaction summaries are Î0, and the analyses of divisional performance based on the transactional
data are all the other potential outputs Ii. Markus’ description of the FIS implementation and more particularly
the effects it elicited regarding data and information sharing are evidently readily understandable and
explainable in terms of our value-based analysis.

LIMITATIONS AND SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS
A number of simplifying assumptions have been made in the foregoing analysis. Among these are:
Non-informational results of sharing and other pressures
Non-information based outputs and other pressures, have not been considered. For example, an organization
may implement various incentives in order to encourage information sharing. These may affect the attitudes and
value calculations of the various organizational actors, and consequently their decisions about whether and how
to share. In order to incorporate these aspects our analysis could be extended along the lines of Ajzen and
Fishbein’s “Theory of Reasoned Action” or TRA (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) in which
a behaviour is deemed the combined result of a behavioural intention, attitudes and social norms as follows
(after Upmeyer 1989):
B = w1BI + (AB) w2 + (SN) w3
where
B = overt behaviour
BI = behaviour intention
w1 = empirical weight attached to BI
AB = attitude toward behaviour B
w2 = empirical weight attached to AB
SN = subjective norms
w3 = empirical weight attached to SN
and
AB = Σ BiEi
where
Bi = belief that behaviour will lead to outcome i
Ei = evaluation of expected outcome i
and a similar sum is made over the various sources of social norms to whom the actor is subject, and the actor’s
motivation to act in accordance with those norms. Our analysis is limited to the attitudinal component in TRA,
omitting the distinction between a behavioural intent, the behaviour itself and the effect of social norms or other
pressures that may exist.
Definition of the dataset to be shared
It has been assumed that all actors share a common understanding of what comprises the dataset D0 and that they
base their subjective value calculations on that understanding. However, even though the different actors may
believe they have such a common understanding about what D0 is, they may not have it in fact. Thus, even if all
the actors concur that sharing D0 is desirable as a result of their various value calculations, it may then emerge
that the “D0”, on which their considerations were based, was different, possibly invalidating their conclusions
regarding sharing it. See, for example, our discussion of the FIS described by Markus (1983) above in relation
to the outputs I0 and Î0.
Commonality of the process and output sets across actors
We have assumed that that each actor has perfect and identical knowledge of what comprises the set of
processes P = {P0, P1, … Pn} and their corresponding information outputs I = {I0, I1, … In}. We have also

assumed that each actor perceives the same set of organizational actors and their connection to the processes P
in their environment as every other actor. However, none of these assumptions are likely to be correct, at least in
general. Different actors may be expected to know about and visualize different sets of processes P and their
information outputs I. Therefore their subjective value calculations will vary not only because of differences of
perception regarding the value of the various information outputs, but also because of differences of perception
regarding what those outputs will in fact be in the first place. Moreover, because different actors may operate
with different conceptions of who the actors other than themselves are, as well as the linkage of these actors to
the information producing processes P, their value based motivations for data sharing (if any) may then be
distributed across a different set of actor entities than is the case for others doing similar data sharing value
assessments. While this would complicate the analysis in a particular case, it does not affect the analysis already
presented.
On-sharing
It is possible that, once a dataset has been shared with an actor Ai (by, say, A0) then the receiving actor’s value
calculations may differ so significantly from A0’s that it results in them passing on the dataset that originated
from A0 to further actors that A0 would not have shared with on the basis of A0’s own value calculations. It may
be, however, that if A0 knows about and assesses this risk, it will have its effect on their original subjective
probability and value estimations regarding sharing with Ai. If this is indeed the case, then the model can be
regarded as taking this possibility into account without need of modification.
Context
The number of actual and possible information producing processes P applicable to any particular dataset of
significant size or complexity will most likely be large. Moreover, it is probable that even if different actors
think they are talking about the same information producing process and output, they are not. The reason lies in
the presence of contextual factors and interaction effects with other datasets, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Context
D
D0 0

Other
datasets

Process (P)
D0

Information (I)

Figure 4: Complicating effect of contextual factors and interaction effects.
Even if the input dataset (D0) is the same and the actors think that they are running the same process Pi on it, the
output information is unlikely to be the same because of differences in other inputs and context, even if the
actors themselves do not recognise them as being present, relevant or different. Shared data and information are
subject to interpretation and cannot be assumed to hold the same meaning for those who have it (Miranda and
Saunders 2003). It is therefore likely that the majority of processes shown in Figure 3 are actually unique to a
single actor. In sharing a dataset with other actors, the originating actor should therefore expect that the
receiving actor may well derive different information outcomes from the shared dataset than what they (the
originating actor) might expect, even if they know in considerable detail what the receiving actor intends doing
with it.
Network, feedback and learning effects
The analysis has assumed that data resident in some dataset is input to information producing processes P, and
that the output is produced from that input in a single stage process. However, the output of one process Pi may
itself form the input for a different process Pj, and so on. The reality, then, is rather a complex network of
interlinked information producing processes, many of which operate upon or are affected by, in a contextual or
interactive sense, the outputs of other information producing processes.
Feedback effects may also exist to complicate matters even further. In subsequent time periods, actor A0 may
have an improved ability to assess the value to themselves of sharing particular data sets. Similarly, other actors
in the organisation may have a different understanding of A0’s motivation to share data. As these actors learn, the
sharing dynamic may change commensurately.

FACTORS AFFECTING SHARING
In order for sharing to occur, the actor that is deciding whether or not to share a dataset D0 needs to have a set of
possible processes P0, P1, P2, …, Pn, their corresponding information outputs I0, I1, I2, …, In, and a set of
estimated probabilities { pijk }in mind on which to base their deliberations. Factors affecting this are as follows.
Awareness of Other Organizational Actors and the Effect of Ignorance
While it may be possible in principle to develop a list of all possible processes one could carry out on a given
dataset, this would be infeasible in reality. Instead, the set of processes P0, P1, P2, …, Pn would more realistically
be constructed from the sharing actor’s awareness of the other organizational actors and what they might
conceivably do with the data if they were given the opportunity. In a similar way, the subjective estimation of
the probability of each actor actually running a particular process on the dataset would depend on the knowledge
and understanding the sharing actor had of the other party with whom they were considering sharing.
It is interesting, in this context, to consider the effect of ignorance of the originating actor regarding the other
party with whom they may be contemplating sharing. As Tversky and Fox (1995) note, “People typically do not
know the exact probabilities associated with the relevant outcomes, but they have some vague notion about their
likelihood”. Tversky and Fox find that the decision-making impact of a possible outcome moving from
possibility to impossibility, or vice versa, is significantly greater than if it just becomes more or less probable.
Now, with respect to data or information sharing, ignorance of the other actor amounts to the admission of
anything they might conceivably do with the dataset into the realm of possibility. Furthermore, we may assume
that of the complete set of processes and information outputs that could be run on the dataset concerned, the
number that would be deemed illegitimate would greatly outnumber those considered legitimate. On this
assumption, an actor’s value calculation regarding data and information sharing under conditions of ignorance is
highly likely to be negative. Moreover, under conditions of uncertainty, it is known that lower probabilities are
overestimated compared to intermediate to high ones (Fox and Tversky 1998): if something is deemed to be
possible the probability of its actual occurrence tends to be overestimated. Alternatively, if the sharing actor
knows enough about the other party to say with confidence that they will not run a certain process with the
shared dataset then this will, as a result, contribute nothing to the sharing actor’s value calculation since the
relevant pijk is zero. Further, since the probability pijk is now zero rather than some vague but non-zero amount
and, under conditions of ignorance of the other actor, overestimated value, this may have a disproportionate
impact on the decision to share compared to a simple change from one non-zero probability to another.
Trust and Social Interaction
Trust, or the willingness to allow oneself to be vulnerable to the actions of another over whose behaviour one
has no control, has a positive effect on information sharing (e.g. Zand 1972, Butler 1999). Shapiro et al. (1992)
identify three sources of trust: deterrence based, knowledge based, and identification based. Knowledge-based
trust is founded in the confidence the trusting actor has that they know what the other party will do, and that the
trusted party will act benevolently with respect to their interests. In terms of our analysis, this amounts to the
sharing actor knowing (or thinking they know) what the receiving actor will do with the dataset they are
contemplating sharing (i.e. knows the processes they probably will or will not run), and that their value
calculation based on that knowledge for sharing is positive. Accordingly, the sharing actor will be inclined to
trust and therefore share the dataset with the other party, as we have argued above. Alternatively, if the sharing
actor does not know what the receiving actor will do but nevertheless identifies with them as being similar or
empathic to themselves, then they can safely make assumptions about what the receiving actor may do with the
shared dataset.
Social interaction is known to have a “significant positive effect” on knowledge sharing (Tsai 2002) and,
presumably, on data and information sharing also (Phillips et al. 2004). Moreover, explicit reward systems
appear to be less effective at encouraging sharing behaviour (e.g. Bartol and Srivastava 2002, Bock and Kim
2002). However, organizational actors that engage in social interaction learn, through that interaction, more
about each other as it proceeds. With respect to potential data, information and knowledge sharing, this learning
enables each actor to assess more and more accurately how the other is likely to behave in the event of sharing
taking place. This suggests that knowledge of the other party through social interaction can encourage sharing,
but we would argue that instead of there being a direct linkage between such interaction and sharing, this rather
occurs through an intervening value calculation step based on increased knowledge of, or identification based
assumptions regarding, what the other party is likely to do with the shared dataset.

CONCLUSIONS
A primary implication of the analysis presented here is that in organizational situations where there are multiple
datasets, many actual or potential information producing processes that do or could act on those datasets, and
many organizational actors who may operate those processes, the unhindered sharing and integration of data
across the organization is very likely to be difficult if not impossible to achieve. The process of trying to achieve
such sharing or integration is likely to be fraught with difficulty and associated organizational strife. While this
conclusion is no doubt unsurprising since this has been the experience of many organizations over many years,
despite the undoubted existence of information technology capabilities capable of delivering the data and
information sharing aimed at, our intention in this paper has been to try to establish a firmer and more formal
theoretical understanding of at least some of the reasons why this might be so.
Most business applications of information technology now entail data and information sharing not only
internally but increasingly externally to the organization. It is, therefore, more important than ever to better
understand the motivations that encourage as well as hinder such sharing. The motivations for data and
information sharing are well discussed and documented in the relevant literature. There are any number of
articles touting the benefits waiting to be reaped from increased intra-organizational and inter-organizational
sharing of data and information. Nevertheless, despite these undoubted benefits the sharing involved is often
very difficult to achieve.
This paper has provided a value-based analysis of data and information sharing that throws some light on why
organizational actors may view information systems and other technologies that are targeted at achieving
increased data and information sharing with misgivings and why the data and information sharing that they can
undoubtedly provide in a technological sense is often not achieved in practice.
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